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Taipei 2162

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

1. FOLLOWING IS EMBASSY ASSESSMENT PRESENT GRC POSTURE ON MILITARY INITIATIVE AGAINST MAINLAND:

2. MILITARY: THERE CONTINUE TO BE NO OVERT SIGNS OF PREPARATION FOR ANY MAJOR MILITARY ACTION AGAINST THE MAINLAND, AND NO DETECTABLE INCREASES IN PLANNING, TRAINING, OR ACCUMULATION OF SUPPLIES OR SHIPPING. THE GRC HAS MADE NO SPECIAL REQUESTS FOR US MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF EVENTS ON THE MAINLAND. WE HAVE RELIABLE REPORTS THAT PRESIDENT CHIANG HAS ORDERED THAT NO ACTIONS BE TAKEN TO PROVOKE CHICOMS.

3. AUTHORITATIVE PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY: GRC DECIDED IN OCTOBER 1966 THAT TRADITIONAL "COUNTERATTACK" THEME WOULD NO LONGER BE PUSHED BECAUSE OF LOW CREDIBILITY AMONG OVERSEAS CHINESE, THOSE ON THE MAINLAND, AND ELSEWHERE. AMBASSADOR LIU'S UNGA SPEECH, AND PRESIDENT CHIANGS DOUBLE TEN, NEW YEARS DAY AND FREEDOM DAY (JANUARY 23) MESSAGES ALL MUTED MILITARY ASPECT OF GRC POLICY OF "NATIONAL RECOVERY."

4. THE WORD FILTERS DOWN: GRC HAS APPARENTLY FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO SWITCH SMOOTHLY FROM TIME-HONORED "COUNTERATTACK" PROPAGANDA LINE TO NEW APPROACH WHICH EMPHASIZES CULTURAL, MORAL AND HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF GRC ASPIRATIONS FOR

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FELLOW-COUNTRYMEN ON MAINLAND. AMBASSADOR CHOU SHU-K'AI'S RECENT EMBARRASSMENT IS GOOD EXAMPLE OF THIS. HE ATTRACTED CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION WHEN ON JANUARY 10 HE REPORTEDLY SAID IN WASHINGTON THAT GRC WAS PREPARING FOR "COUNTERATTACK." BY JANUARY 19, HOWEVER, HE WAS USING INSTEAD PRESIDENT CHIANGS NEW YEARS DAY THESIS THAT GRCS RETURN TO MAINLAND WAS PRIMARILY A POLITICAL, NOT MILITARY MATTER. GRC AMBASSADOR TO MANILA APPARENTLY MADE SIMILAR SHIFT IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME. OUR EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN JANUARY 12 AND 14 TO GRC (TAIPEIS 2083) MAY HAVE HELPED ACHIEVE THESE SHIFTS.

5. PRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION ON TAIWAN: GRC MAINTAINS THE CLAIM THAT IT IS SOLE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF ALL CHINA. LEGAL BASIS NOR NATIONAL GOVERNMENT APPARATUS, WITH MAINLANDERS MAKING ALL IMPORTANT DECISIONS, AND FOR INTERNATIONAL STATUS IN UN, RESTS ON THIS CLAIM. GIVEN THESE PRESENT DAY REALITIES AS WELL AS HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND PAST PUBLIC UTTERANCES ABOUT "COUNTERATTACK" OR "MAINLAND RECOVERY" IT WOULD BE STRANGE INDEED IF ALL COMMENTS ON THESE SUBJECTS SUDDENLY CEASED, AND THEY HAVE NOT.

TRADITIONAL "RE-TAKE THE MAINLAND" SLOGANS STILL APPEAR PAINTED ON WALLS IN TAIPEI, AND ARE SHOUTED IN UNISON AT MILITARY PARADES AND ANTI-COMMUNIST RALLIES. POLEMICISTS IN KMT AND LEGISLATIVE HUAN CONTINUE TO URGE PROMPT ACTION AGAINST MAINLAND TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF CURRENT DISARRAY. HOWEVER, UNTIL THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE IN FORM OF OFFICIAL APPROACHES, STATEMENTS, OR MILITARY PREPARATIONS, THESE RITUALISTIC WARCRIES SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS PRESAGING A GRC INTENTION TO LAUNCH AN INVASION OF THE MAINLAND AT THIS TIME.

6. FUTURE GRC ACTIONS: IF SITUATION ON MAINLAND CHANGES MARKEDLY, CALLS FOR COUNTERATTACK FROM CERTAIN OLD GUARD KMT ELEMENTS COULD BECOME LOUDER AND MORE FREQUENT. SOME OFFICIALS COULD SEEK TO PERSUADE PRESIDENT CHIANG THAT LARGE SCALE MILITARY ACTION IS FEASIBLE. IN THIS EVENT WE ANTICIPATE THAT THE GRC WOULD INITIATE OFFICIAL CONSULTATIONS AS REQUIRED UNDER THE 1954 MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY AND THAT US LOGISTIC ASSISTANCE WOULD BE REQQESTED. IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT THAT GRC DECIDED TO TAKE UNILATERAL MILITARY ACTION ON ANY LARGE SCALE WE BELIEVE THAT SUCH PREPARATIONS WOULD BE DETECTED BY US IN ADVANCE. GRC COULD INITIATE SMALL SCALE ACTIVITY WITHOUT OUR PRIOR KNOWLEDGE.

7. EMBASSY AND OTHER US AGENCIES WILL MAINTAIN CLOSE WATCH FOR SIGNS OF UNILATERAL MILITARY ACTION.
HUMMEL